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Despite the money and sweat that go into new instructional technologies, they do not produce the
overall high level of student performances that societies seek.  More effective teaching calls for a
profound solution. It requires a coordinate triad of factors: a proper science, the correct organizational
structure, and an engineering instructional technology. This second of a series of articles on the
Triad Model of Education concentrates on instructional engineering. The instructional engineering
drawn from the science is contingency-based. Contingency-based instructional systems always
handle the inevitable two components of instruction: the repertoires of students and the setups that
shape those repertoires. The setup component features five elements: subject matter, objectives,
quality control, presentation modes, and logistics. The repertoire component consists of the governance
of repertoires—event and lingual governed, the type of repertoire—knowing, solving, and creating,
and the variability of the repertoire—convergent and divergent. These elements, and their required
engineering, reveal an instructional task more complex than previously considered. Progress with
such complexity occurs only when all components of the triad are in place.
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A pesar del dinero y el sudor que forman parte de las nuevas tecnologías instructivas, no producen
el alto nivel global de logro por parte de los estudiantes que las sociedades buscan. Una enseñanza
más efectiva requiere una solución profunda. Requiere una tríada coordinada de factores: una
ciencia adecuada, una estructura organizacional correcta y una tecnología instructiva de ingeniería.
Este segundo artículo de una serie de artículos sobre el Modelo Tríada de Educación se centra
en la ingeniería instructiva. La ingeniería instructiva extraída de la ciencia se basa en las
contingencias. Los sistemas basados en contingencias siempre manejan los dos componentes
inevitables de la instrucción: los repertorios de los estudiantes y los contextos o escenarios que
dan forma a dichos repertorios. El componente contextual consta de cinco elementos: la asignatura,
los objetivos, el control de la calidad, los modos de presentación y la logística. El componente
del repertorio consiste en el gobierno de los repertorios—gobernados por eventos y por la lengua,
el tipo de repertorio—saber, resolver y crear y la variabilidad del repertorio—convergente y
divergente. Estos elementos y su ingeniería necesaria revelan una tarea instructiva más compleja
de lo que se había pensado con anterioridad. El progreso con dicha complejidad sólo ocurre
cuando todos los componentes de la tríada se encuentran en su lugar.
Palabras clave: modelo tríada de educación, conductología, organización colaborativa, instrucción
basada en contingencias
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Failure of Instructional Technology
Everyone assumes that a better instructional technology
will solve the problem of teaching more effectively. All
sorts of hopes are raised over the latest technique or tool.
No year passes without extraordinary enthusiasm over a
new technique such as discovery learning or direct
instruction or precision teaching or personalized system of
instruction. And from time to time, a gadget such as the
computer, or its offspring the internet, is hailed as the final
breakthrough from the reality of dismal instruction to the
dream of effective teaching. Yet, none of these tools and
techniques succeed as promised. Evidently, the presumption
is wrong.
We reach a conclusion that is nonintuitive but
nevertheless correct. A good instructional technology is not
sufficient for instructional success. Two wonderful
instructional innovations were programmed instruction (p.i.)
and the personalized system of instruction (p.s.i.). Both
failed. They failed not because they could not instruct
effectively. In the hands of those who knew the science and
who had the proper organization resource base, both p.i.
and p.s.i. instructed well. They failed for two reasons.
First, a huge disconnect developed between these
instructional technologies and the science from which they
derived. People who knew little of the background science
of these technologies jumped onto what was then a fast
moving bandwagon. The bandwagon came to a stop because
these people did not know how to feed the horses. They
adopted the forms of the procedures without understanding
the processes responsible for the procedures. They went
through the motions without understanding the dynamics
behind the motions. They prescribed actions without
designing the contingencies that give meaning to actions.
Given this lack of scientific understanding, it is no surprise
these technologies, by and large, halted. Continual success
with any technology requires a savvy discernment of its
underlying science. It requires engineers.
Second, a consistently overlooked factor also played its
part. As just pointed out and everyone acknowledges, a
technology necessitates competent practitioners to carry it
out. But success in applying any technology demands even
more than that obvious requirement. It further demands the
organization of practitioners in a manner that efficiently
achieves the social aims of that technology. Only through
organized endeavor do technologies achieve their aims. A
proper division of labor is needed. From movie-making to
complex surgery, the allocation of various specialized
repertoires to achieve a common goal constitutes the vital
principle of organized endeavor. On top of that, it is
necessary to coordinate and control effectively the assorted
forms of activities relevant to technical endeavor. Without
the proper organization of a novel technology, little can be
accomplished. But currently, educational institutions are
organized for an outmoded technology.
The Triad Model of Education
Who can object to a better instructional technology, either
of tools or of techniques? Everyone can easily agree on its
necessity. But more is needed. Traditional educators as well
as behaviorists, behavior analysts, and behaviorologists, hold
too narrow a focus. They concentrate only on instructional
technology. But advancing a good teaching technique is not
sufficient for educational success. That technique requires
active connection to the science from which it derives. Such
a connection calls for people who know how to make that
connection. As important, to execute effectively any
technology necessitates the proper division of labor and that
labor’s proper control and coordination. If these other aspects
of a social innovation are not in place, then success occurs
rarely, or haphazardly, or not at all.
As Skinner (1968, p. 5) pointed out, “… teaching is
simply the arrangement of contingencies of reinforcement.”
But the definition makes a demand. The simple definition
encapsulates a complex prerequisite. Arrangements cannot
be made without having arrangers. These arrangers must be
skilled for arrangements to work as they should. The
necessary skills derive from the science that analyzes
contingency arrangements. And these arrangements,
especially in dealing with large numbers of diverse
repertoires, should not be handled as if their components
did not affect each other. Instructional arrangements are
systems whose components must coordinate with each other.
Furthermore, the depth and extent of these components
involve specialized skills. Contingency arrangers work with
others whose skills complement theirs so they can
accomplish together what they cannot achieve separately.
For eventual success, the problem of instructional
effectiveness demands a broad based solution. Its solution
in any educational setting takes a trio of factors: science,
organization, and engineering. None by itself will sustain
instructional effectiveness. Each part of this triadic set can
be considered separately, but they work jointly. In education,
as in any institutional endeavor, they tie together inextricably.
None is independent of the other. Whether acknowledged
or not, each works in tandem with the others. They must
be harnessed correctly and be suitable to each other. Such
suitability implies that the triad components of science,
organization, and engineering cannot be accidental hand-
me-downs, and their relationship a chance one.
So, this trio of factors must consist of the proper science
base, the proper organizational structure, and the proper
instructional engineering. Together, the three constitute the
triad model of education. The triad model of education relies
upon a science whose subject matter is the analysis of
behavioral contingencies—behaviorology. The educational
organization in the triad model consists of a division of
labor that is team-based and whose control and coordination
operates through overlapping sets of cybernetically-linked
systems of activities, and thus can be designated as
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collaborative. And the instructional technology of the triad
model becomes an instructional engineering endeavor
executed through contingency-based systems of instruction.
Behaviorological Science
Education consistently maintains its infatuation with tool
technology. From Edison’s long-ago cry that the movie
projector will solve all of education’s problems to the current
hallelujahs over what the computer can accomplish, the
latest delivery devices and computational gadgets are touted
as the means to instructional salvation. The result: teachers
stuck in the wasteland of deficient instructional tools. Any
profound change in effective instruction will not be
physically based, but behaviorally based. Instruction is the
task of transforming repertoires. The tools and techniques
provided by the physical sciences are ancillary to this task.
Most of these tools, such as the internet, allow a larger
number of students to be reached. But it is not the number
of people who are reached that counts. What counts is the
change in those who are reached. Change occurs through
techniques that arrange contingencies that produce, modulate,
and maintain actions. Those contingency-based techniques
derive from a science that analyzes contingencies. (See
Vargas, in press, for an overview.)
The science of contingency relations between actions
and other events is behaviorology. The occurrence, intensity,
and form of all actions depend on their contingent relation
to other events, happening initially just after and then, just
before those actions. Behaviorology is the analysis and
synthesis of these contingency relations. Such analysis and
synthesis covers all behavior, but behaviorology’s underlying
themas are few. A thema implicitly guides effort within a
discipline. (For an analysis of the specific technical and
philosophical meanings of “themas,” see Holtan, 1973, and
for their role in behaviorology, see Vargas, 1996.) Though
all themas are equally important, three pertain particularly
to contingency-based systems of instruction.
A first thema: The meaning of actions is in their relation
to other events. The meaning of a physical event such as
light or sound resides in physics until it is paired in a special
way with activity. The light becomes a so-called
“discriminative stimulus” when it evokes an action due to
prior pairing with a “reinforcer.” The meaning of biological
events such as food or sex resides in biology until these
are related in a special way with actions. Food becomes a
“reinforcer” when it follows an action and increases the
probability of actions within its class occurring in the future.
The only evidence, of course, of such possible future
occurrence is its manifestation in the past. Such a relational
characteristic is one to be found in the older sciences. In
physics, the meaning of a physical event is always in
relation to other physical events. “Force” cannot be
understood apart from “mass” and “acceleration,” as the
equation “Force equals mass times acceleration” (F = MA)
makes clear. These relations are embedded in the analysis
of properties. Physical properties do not lead an ontological
existence apart from the things in which they are discerned,
but neither do they belong to those things. The speed of a
car does not dwell in the car, nor, for that matter, in the
road. It is a relation between the car and the road. Most
individuals can understand the reasonableness of such an
analysis. But it is still difficult for everyone, professional
and lay person alike, to construe that a personality also
does not dwell in a person. For some time a position
advanced by behavioral scientists other than
behaviorologists, though in their own fashion; William
James (1882, p. 179) comments that “… a man has as many
social selves as there are individuals who recognize him
…”. Also difficult to accept is that the meaning of what a
student says is not in the statement, but in the conditions
under which the statement is made. With terms such as
“cheating,” everyone recognizes this distinction.
A second thema: Actions are contingent. “Contingent”
carries two meanings. An event occurs only if another one
does, and, its occurrence is only probable. The likelihood
of lever-pressing in the future occurs only if food is provided
to a hungry animal after pressing a lever in the past, but the
future occurrence of lever-pressing is not inevitable. Other
events may intrude. Whatever action comes about within a
given set of circumstances is the vectored product of a
number of forces that bear on it. The chanciness of predicted
outcomes is especially acute in human affairs where cultural
factors play a part. Technologies, especially those that are
instructional, must give room to the nondeterministic
contingent aspect to predicted outcomes. Not succeeding
with a technique drawn from behaviorological science does
not call for an immediate default to another science such as
neurology. When a space-shot goes awry and blows up on
the launching pad, the engineers do not discard their physics
principles. They reexamine the conclusions they drew from
them and the conditions under which those conclusions were
applied. Behaviorological science is new, which is all the
more reason to be sensitive to the chanciness of the effects
produced with it especially in complex human situations
such as the classroom. (This occurs even with so-called
simpler species; for a number of interesting instances where
actions well taught went astray, see Pryor, 1975.)
A third thema: Within the organism, no agency resides
that causes its actions. Actions, as dependent variables, are
due to the forces, specified as independent variables, that
bear on them. (Even more exactly, it is behavioral properties
descriptive of actions, such as rate, that result from the effect
of a designated energy source, such as a schedule of
reinforcement.) These forces may be inside or outside the
body or in both places concurrently, and may be physical,
biological, and behavioral. Physical forces may be as
ubiquitous as the gravity that dictates the degree to which
we move about on the surface of a sphere such as the earth
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or the moon. Biological forces may be as common as the
actions of muscles, bathed in nutrients, that move us daily.
Behavioral forces may be as widespread as the actions of
others in text and speech that impel action and thought or
stop it. These forces are not prescribed by an agency. The
absence of agency has been well established in physical and
biological analysis. No one now asserts that Zephyrus makes
the west winds blow and Ceres the spring crops bloom.
Common speech still concocts, however, an agency
responsible for complex conduct, especially the conduct of
humans, such as the agency of mind or self or even
personality. But in the paired set of values of an independent
variable to a dependent one as laid out in a graph, what
room is there for an agency to act out? It is not a self that
paces the actions of students through an instructional system,
but arranged instructional contingencies.
Collaborative Organization
Commonly overlooked in the potential application of
any instructional technology is how to organize to carry it
out. Such organization is taken for granted. No one notices
the tie-in between the current way of teaching and the current
manner of organizing it. No one notices because the current
structure of instructional organizations has been around so
long that it seems right and natural. It seems right and natural
that the teacher be someone who knows the subject matter.
It seems right and natural that this person control the
classroom situation by presenting material, by assigning
tasks, and by motivating actions. It seems right and natural
that the teacher meet with students at assigned times and
places and that these students start and end at the same time
with the same material and test at similar times. What seems
right and natural both follows and undergirds the
organizational model that prevails in education. A content
expert presents the subject matter, usually by talking. A
support staff supplies what is needed, from pencils and paper
to computers and internet connections. A centralized
administration issues school policies and procedures, and
arranges for cohorts of students to pass through the various
instructional levels at the proper times and places. This
modal organizational scheme for instruction so conforms
with every expectation and experience that it is not
questioned.
The traditional education organization rests on a simple
proposition: Information is prepared and transmitted, and
then it is received and processed. As such, the traditional
educational organization rests upon a transmitter (the teacher)
who knows what to transmit and a set of receivers (the
learners) who know how to process it. Though conventional
educators and the lay public extol the format of the
individual teacher in the classroom, anecdotes and statistics
reveal the dismal reality of this type of organizational model.
As Gould mentions,
My first teacher of paleontology … lectured from notes
on yellow foolscap that he must have assembled during his
own days in graduate school. The words changed not at all
from year to year, but the paper got older and older. I sat in
the first row, bathed in yellow dust, as the paper cracked and
crumbled every time he turned the page. (1976, p. 24).
Exceptions, of course, are given; persons such as Miss
Mary Graves, B. F. Skinner’s high school teacher to whom
he dedicated his book on instruction. But the term
“exceptions” is relevant. In every society, large numbers of
students do not finish even their elementary school education,
many who are capable do not get the opportunity to attend
higher education, and, whatever the vagaries of grading, of
those who do attend, only a small percent graduate with
repertoires judged as excellent. 
But if education is the shaping of repertoires, then a very
different set of considerations ensues. The emphasis shifts
to the intricate processes by which such shaping occurs.
Organizationally acknowledging the complicated
characteristics of teaching processes requires changing the
division of labor necessary to carry them out. No one person
can carry out all of these processes in a skilled and timely
fashion. An alternative structure in the division of labor for
teaching, and thus in its organization, reflects the complexity
of instruction. 
This alternative organizational structure takes into account
the array of different processes involved in the teaching
operation. These processes make up teaching; for teaching is
more than assigning and presenting a subject matter. Teaching
consists of arranging contingencies between repertoires and
settings, and this arrangement occurs through a variety of
complex operations. These operations consist of: 
• the design of instruction
• the evaluation of instructional effect
• the presentation in various modes of a subject matter
• the logistics of repertoire and setting contacts at
different times and places
• the in-depth exploration of the subject matter.
No one person has the skill and the time to know and to
perform each of these operations in depth. Each operation
requires its own expertise.
Different experts carry out these operations. There are
experts in instructional design, evaluation, presentation,
logistics, and content. Control and coordination of these
differing special skills take place in instructional teams.
These teams produce, present, manage, evaluate, and design
their contingency-based instructional systems. The
instructional team and the contingency-based instructional
system interactively link in iterative reciprocity. Measured
in explicit terms, outcomes guide the next system design.
As repertoires of students are changed, these changes in
turn alter the repertoires of instructional team members. The
new actions of team members produce new instructional
arrangements. This continuous reciprocal interaction drives
innovation. 
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Of course, there is more to an organizational structure
than just instructional teams. These instructional teams
cybernetically connect to other structural elements of the
organization. The cybernetic arrangements make more
sophisticated the reciprocal effects between teaching and
administrative functions so that resource allocations tie to
instructional accomplishment, not to number of students in
a class. Innovative organizational setups become possible.
For example, a more profound organizational layout than
currently found in traditional educational organizations would
be full time quality-control research centers. These centers
would interact with the instructional teams. These research
centers would obtain the latest information from the behavioral
sciences that bear on making the instructional process more
effective and share those data with the instructional teams.
Currently, research findings about human behavior only dribble
down to the classroom instructor. Typically such information
drips haphazardly, with a workshop here, a circular there. In
contrast, instructional system teams would integrate this
information into their operations and share the results with
the research centers. Together, Research Centers and
Instructional Teams would work out the practical implications.
It would be a reciprocally enhancing cooperative effort.
Arranging the proper structure for an organization so desired
is not a unique endeavor. A constant search goes on for the
arrangements that produce optimal performance to achieve
organizational goals. For example, an organizational ambition,
especially in industry and commerce, is innovative action by
employees. Instead of exhorting them “to think new” (as
educational organizations exhort teachers “to teach better”),
companies rearrange their structures to produce innovation
in process and product. The rearrangements range from
changing patterns of face-to-face contact to altering authority
relations between reporting levels. To these new structural
arrangements are attached new metrics in measuring
productivity, as well as new types of rewards. The aim, of
course, is not to make the mistake of thinking a creative
innovator can be hired (as elusive as hiring a great teacher),
but to set out the organizational contingencies by which
innovative action is produced. In like manner, proper
organizational contingencies yield effective teaching. 
Instructional Engineering
Contingency-based systems go through an iterative
process in which each team expert, in joint enterprise,
contributes to the next phase of the system’s design. Each
phase provides an opportunity for incremental improvement
in design and procedures. Procedures are checked against
the science’s principles. It is more than just a simple
application of technology. Contingency-based instruction
conforms to an engineering operation. But the traditional
conventional perspective overlooks, or even denies, and
certainly rejects, teaching as an engineering enterprise.
A survey was conducted by Latham (1999) in which he
inquired of 80 randomly selected educators, engineers, lawyers,
and physicians (20 each) how they solved problems
“commonly experienced in their work” (p. 4). He specifically
addressed the “basis for their solutions” and whether others
in their professions would approach problems in the same
manner. He found that the “most frequently given response
by educators was, ‘I just fly by the seat of my pants.’”(p. 5).
The answers of physicians and lawyers and especially
engineers refer to principles and laws when attempting to
solve specific problems in their disciplines. The responses of
engineers contrasted sharply with those of educators. The
difference in problem-solving orientation between engineers
and educators points to why results are so poor in all areas
of education. Too many educators still consider instruction
to be an art form. It is. But art, one’s personal experience and
style and skill, should be combined with science, the principles
and laws that explain a realm of nature, including that realm
known as “behavioral.” Instruction should be that combination
of art and science known as “engineering.” Specifically, in
education, it should be “instructional engineering.”
The phrase instructional engineering denotes the explicit
derivation of technical procedures from scientific principles.
Liebman (2005, p. 296) describes the endeavor
metaphorically but well. “… an engineer uses the fruits of
science to feed the appetite of technology.” It feeds this
appetite in a different and more nutritious manner than
connoted by “technology.” Instructional engineering differs
from instructional technologies that simply collect prior
practices. These technologies are artisanal techniques
discovered through trial and error. These practices tend to
be successful only in a given setting or with a particular
group—a repeated finding, by those such as the Gates
Foundation who toss money and traditional solutions such
as the small class or the charismatic principal at the
“education problem.” See for example, Greene and Symonds,
2006. With instructional engineering, however, a given
technique finds its justification in a scientific principle and
enhances its potency as it adapts to novel circumstances.
The technique may not work well initially, but a scientific
understanding facilitates finding out “why” and improving
it. And if it works well, understanding of its principles
expedites the next breakthrough. From aeronautical
engineering to genetic engineering, engineering disciplines
derive their systemic technologies from the frameworks of
their parent physical and biological sciences. In education,
the science of behaviorology provides the framework for
contingency-based instructional systems. 
Contingency-based instructional systems embody the
specific forms of the engineering endeavors derived from
behaviorology. They resemble each other only to the degree
that they operate within the framework of the science and
with the division of labor demanded by the instructional
task. Otherwise they differ in the particulars shaped by
specific circumstances. We can, however, provide a prototype
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of a contingency-based instructional system. The prototype
gives an overview of the system’s two fused components:
“repertoire,” and “setup.” Each component consists of
elements, such as “governance” in the repertoire component,
and “objectives” in the setup component. At deeper detail,
the attributes of the constituent elements characterize any
contingency-based instructional system. A dynamic outcome
ensues from the taxonomic scheme. The interaction of
elements within and between the two sets of system
components creates instructional consequences. As it is an
open system sensitive to its consequences, the instructional
system’s contingent outcomes affect future features of the
instructional environment. Note the significance of the phrase
“instructional environment”: It is not a person who teaches.
It is an instructional environment that teaches. (See, for
example, Hursh & Tucci, 2005.)
Instructional Setup Component
The setup component of a contingency-based instructional
system features five constituent elements: subject matter,
objectives, quality control, presentation modes, and logistics.
To some degree, these are found in most instructional
arrangements. Even the crudest instructional arrangement (such
as the lecture) contains most of these elements, though at a
primitive level. The lecture “covers” a subject, the instructor
tests for it, the presentation mode conveys the material through
a talk, and the registrar arranges when and where the students
assemble. In traditional instruction, these system elements are
not well utilized. Few instructors use test results in a quality
control fashion; for example, changing how they lecture based
on what those results reveal. Some instructors deny that they
have objectives, overlooking the ones implicit in what their
tests cover. Most instructors do not schedule their students’
instruction, but accept the registrar’s arrangements of how and
when groups of students encounter their subject matter. All
instructors engage in a given presentation mode, typically the
age-old one of talking in person. These system elements have
been known for some time, and typically applied to group-
based instruction that batch-processes students based on the
mythical average student. In contrast, contingency-based
instruction deals quite explicitly with an instructional system’s
component elements of subject matter, objectives, quality
control, presentation modes, and logistics, and addresses quite
explicitly the central problem of mass education—the variability
of student repertoires.
Subject-matter is disciplinary driven and ideologically
driven. From anthropology and art to zither-making and
zoology, it is obvious to acknowledge the effect of a
discipline in a subject matter. Disciplinary information, the
specifics of a branch of knowledge, presumably makes up
a subject matter. Not so obvious is what is interpreted as
the content of that discipline, and even more so, which
aspects of that content should be taught to whom and at
what grade level.
Independent of what is taught, there is the question of
who is taught and how much. Many societies do not deem
it proper to teach females literacy skills beyond a certain
level of basic reading and writing, much less advanced
mathematics and sciences. Western societies entertained this
prejudice for many centuries. At best, females were said to
be not capable of learning these subjects. At worse, it was
believed they would be corrupted by them. For example,
the American woman and author and early feminist, Mercy
Otis Warren, was taught basic literary skills by her uncle
but then, as Waters, the American historian, describes, she
was
forced into ladylike needlework… All of this, she intensely
resented and wrote that if females dealt with trifles and men
with power, the ‘deficiency lies not so much in [the] inferior
contexture of female intellects as in the different education
bestowed on the sexes.’ (Morison, Waters, & Flexner, 1975,
p. 98).
More than one or two societies, or groups within them,
still entertain these notions. Of course it is not only women
who endure these inequities. For economic and other reasons,
elites with power often ensure the subordination of a given
class of people by restricting access to the basic asset for
further capital—skill. Such effort need not be gross. Tax
policies can price higher education beyond the reach of
social classes of low income.
Another common aspect of a subject matter is how it is
to be interpreted prior to its presentation. For example, it
would seem that, as a well established science, the content
of a biology course would be rather straightforward. But
ferocious struggles are waged over the selection of biology
topics, from those between scientists and creationists over
intelligent design as an alternative to evolution, to those
morally infused shouting matches between a number of
indignant groups over the extent and degree of topics dealing
with sexuality. And in teaching the politics of democratic
societies, it is doubtful that any school at any level in any
place in Florida teach the writings of Che Guevara as a
guide to social planning while only a few miles south in
Cuba, such writings would be a common part of the
educational curriculum. What constitutes course content
ensues from fierce battles at the local school board and in
the highest offices of the bureau of education. In these
matters, the teacher in the classroom has only a partial say,
if that much.
It is doubtful that any instructional system or
organizational arrangement would change the reality of such
social infusion into the curriculum. But such reality
underscores the fact that the teacher, the putative content
expert, already shares authority with others over the subject
presented in the classroom. Becoming part of a teaching
team does not diminish whatever authority the content expert
has over curricular matters. In fact, it enhances it. It
underscores the fact that there is an expert in the subject
matter. The rest of the instructional team contribute their
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special skills outside of the content area. (For further
discussion on these matters, see Vargas, 2004).
Objectives address both the repertoires of individuals
and the features of an instructional system. Each type of
objective delineates the aims of an instructional system at
different levels of analysis. For a class of individuals,
behavioral objectives specify observable performances at a
standard. For a long time, tests have played this role
indirectly without specifying beforehand the performance
desired. Even behavioral objectives can be too general when
they deal with a cohort of students rather than the clearly
defined repertoires of each student in a class. Behavioral
objectives can distinguish individual students’ repertoires,
but that requires an instructional system both resource
intensive and measurement savvy. (The measurement
procedures of “Precision Teaching” address the activities of
individual students. See, for example, Fabrizio & Moors,
2003.) System objectives address the relation of instructional
outcome to resources expended. Specifically, instructional
outcome compares an aspect of performance over a time or
fiscal denominator, or as combined. Currently, in traditional
education, it is the rare instructor who specifies both system
and behavioral objectives. These constitute, however, a
necessary and integral part of a contingency-based
instructional system.
Objectives change with iterations of the instructional
system’s operation. A brand new instructional system may
start with a system objective of fifty percent of its students
achieving within six months a high criterion level of
mastery. On that system’s second iteration, it may aim for
a twenty percent improvement and state a goal of sixty
percent achievement with the same requirements within the
same time frame and with the same cost. With further
iterations, cost and time factors become increasingly
sophisticated. For example, the instructional team could
take into account the amount of time a student takes to
achieve a criterion level. All things considered, the less
time demanded of the student to achieve mastery, the
superior the instruction. Currently, too many instructors
outsource the effort they should make in teaching by
demanding greater efforts by students in homework.
Homework effort is the student doing the teacher’s job. In
contingency-based instructional systems (C-bIS), increases
in productivity come about through greater efficiency of
operation. Iterations also change the quality and type of
behavioral objectives. The same instructional system may
start with its behavioral objectives at the knowledge level
with all students achieving them within a fixed frame of
time. Later, it alters behavioral objectives to fit flexible
rates of achievement among the varying student repertoires.
It brings in new objectives at the solving level, tailored to
each student’s interests. Eventually further individualization
can occur and objectives at the creating level brought in.
Both system and behavioral objectives continue to change
as an instructional system evolves.
Quality Control, in some fashion, appears in every
course, but typically in haphazardly poor form. A student
studies an assignment at home, at the library, at the cafeteria,
and no one observes what kind of contact that student made
with the material. Traditional educational arrangements place
students in a “teaching” situation (more accurately, in
situations where they teach themselves), and later, frequently
far later, tests those students. In the first week of school,
students sit in a lecture room and listen, it is hoped, to what
the instructor says, and eventually, those students take a test
on some portion of what was said. The relation between
instructional condition and performance effect is not
observed, or if by chance observed, only observed in a
nonsystematic fashion. What is necessary is to move away
from so-called “testing.” In “tests” no immediate point-to-
point feedback exists between an instructional variable and
a performance variable. Without this detailed feedback,
evaluation of an instructional technology is at best crude
and clumsy, at worst, misleading. And not only crude and
clumsy and misleading; current grading arrangements
compromise both instructor and student. Without directly
measuring and observing the student’s change in performance
as it occurs, cheating proliferates. Not only cheating on the
part of the students, cheating as well by teachers as when,
driven by mandated standards, they are tempted to teach to
the test. Furthermore, grading on comparisons between
students—the norm ranking of what each student learned
relative to another—perverts the instructor’s accomplishment.
In a class where material was poorly taught and poorly
learned, fifty percent mastery on a student’s part can receive
an “A” grade, yet, because only a few “A’s” are given,
scholastic quality presumably has been maintained. And
lastly, and as important, without exact knowledge of the
relation between students’ performances and instructional
conditions, it is not possible over time for either an
instructor’s or an organization’s performance to improve. Is
there any university whose teaching practices and successes
do not resemble those of the earliest universities of the
fourteenth century?
In a contingency-based instructional system, quality
control consists of three factors: standards, feedback, and
evaluation. Standards must take into account future demands
on student performances. Any later course that follows the
current one will require entry repertoires that allow an
instructional sequence to begin properly. A philosophy course
requires complex reading and writing skills; a calculus course,
mastery of algebra; lab and music courses, the deft handling
of tools and instruments. Beyond that obvious requirement
occurs a more subtle and profound effect: the relation between
standards and repertoires. Standards in relation to entry
repertoires bear upon an instructional system’s design. For
example: If standards are high and entry repertoires are weak,
then the sequence of instructional units take longer to
complete, passages between concepts become more detailed,
and examples and illustrations increase in number. Similar
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considerations apply elsewhere such as with type of exit
repertoire and social demands. Feedback is the specific point-
to-point description of each student’s repertoire as it contacts
an instructional setting. Specific strengths and weaknesses
of any instructional arrangement can then be specified not
only in the usual manner of “errors,” but also in such other
properties as rate of positive change in the student’s
performance. In fact, the notion of “error” changes for it is
as much a matter of “error” on the system’s part as it is on
the student’s. Feedback becomes a hunt for reasons as to
why a performance occurred as it did, and what aspect of
the instructional setup was responsible. As specific
descriptions of varying action properties are produced, the
volume of data obtained becomes enormous both with respect
to one student over time and many students concurrently and
over time. Evaluation relates those data to objectives,
standards, costs, and any other consideration deemed
important by the system’s designers. It may be worthwhile
to reach a certain standard, but at what cost in time and
money? These assessments involve policy considerations in
the larger organizational context.  
Presentation Modes are simply the means by which
instruction is delivered. Everyone is familiar with machines
in a variety of presentation modes: overhead, video,
computer, and so on. Humans also are a presentation mode.
They have two great advantages over machines. The first
is interactivity, reacting to a characteristic of the student’s
performance and adjusting the next instructional feature to
that characteristic. In this feature, the computer now comes
close to matching the human skill. The second is emotional
tone. Elements of sociability, warm regard, bonding, and
other well known characteristics of human interaction enter
into and are necessary in instructional settings. No machine
can substitute for the specific emotional ties between
humans. In other delivery conditions, a machine can do a
better job than a human being. Machines present pictures
and sounds in ways no human can match. Machines store
data with a capacity and accuracy no human can
approximate. Machines neutralize the negative aspects of
certain sorts of social interactions. Machines display
processes otherwise not possible or plausible to contact such
as those that are too fast, too slow, or too dangerous. In
such comparisons between machines and humans, it is not
a question of the superiority of the one over the other.
Human beings do not replace machines, and machines do
not replace human beings. Each is useful in the instructional
setting for which it is best suited. Neither teaches. The
contingencies in the setting do, utilizing the presentation
mode best suited for a particular lesson.
The latter point should be kept firmly in mind, for many
are becoming enamored of so-called “E-learning,” the use
of the internet and other electronic means, to deliver
information and thus, presumably, teach. People are charmed
by the proliferation of computer stations, and rank as an up-
to-date teaching facility one with the greatest number of
computers. A celebratory noise is made over how many
students sit at each computer station. But books could just
as easily be given to every student and the claim made that
if students read the books, they are now taught. It cannot
be overemphasized that a way of delivering instruction is
not the same as instructing with what is being delivered.
Logistics orders the movement of students through the
sequences and forms of instruction of an instructional system.
For the classroom teacher in traditional instruction, logistics
rarely presents itself as an issue. The registrar’s office regulates
when and where students encounter instructional arrangements.
It designates the total frame of time of instruction (either the
semester, the summer session, the four-week course, the two-
day seminar, and so on), the partial length of time for
instruction (an hour, more or less), and the specific hours and
places of instruction (time of the day and site). The logistics
arrangement reveals clearly that traditional education presumes
a certain commonality among students. It adopts as an
organizing principle the notion of an average student at a
given level of knowledge and skill with the same capacity to
learn within a given time frame. In traditional instruction, all
students allowed entry into a calculus course are considered
capable of understanding the material. If certain students do
not do as well as others within the same time frame, then the
finger of blame thumps those students. A variety of self-
serving reasons are given—the students were not smart, not
motivated, not attentive, and so on. Traditional education
demonstrates the no-diversity principle of equivalent students
through the factory-like batch processing of students. Students
proceed in lock-step scheduling through the various stages
of the instructional material. Little allowance is given for the
diversity in student repertoires. The logistics arrangements of
current education are built not only for the convenience of
those running the educational organization, but also built on
the assumption that students and student repertoires are more
alike than different.
In contingency-based instructional systems, these logistics
arrangements contrast considerably from those of traditional
education. Since students differ in what they know, in how
they know, and what they can do with what they know, the
contingency-based pacing of students accommodates their
extraordinary variety. Students start and end the lesson units
of an instructional system at different times. They proceed
through a sequence of material at different rates. They meet
one-to-one or as a group with instructors at different dates
and places. They encounter instructional arrangements in
differing sequences. Depending on what the instructional
designers think best, any given student may proceed through
a sequence of instructional activities that differs from other
students. To accommodate the complexity of these
instructional arrangements, contingency-based instructional
systems decentralize the logistics function and run the student
through the teaching sites and time frames at the local level
of an instructional system. Logistics requires its own
expertise within the teaching team.
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Instructional Repertoire Component
Instruction, if successful, changes repertoires. It shapes
them to given specifications. In whatever country, educational
institutions prescribe a plethora of tests to certify that a
particular repertoire is in place. Societies send students to
schools so that students, whatever their behavior when they
start, are to leave with behavior that is desired. To transform
behavior from an entry to an exit repertoire characterizes
the work of educational organizations. Specific technologies
carry out this transformation effort. In any instructional
setting, every instructional technology attempts its
transformation effort in the three repertoire domains of
governance, type, and variability.
Governance of Repertoire: Few people simply watch an
action without providing a reason for it. Providing reasons,
whether in the form of gossip or theory, is one of the most
commonplace activities in which everyone engages.
Neighborhood gossips speculate as to why a neighbor waters
his lawn even on days it rained. Television talking heads
pontificate as to why a particular politician voted as he did.
Classroom teachers conjecture why students fail tests, and
often say: “because they did not study enough.” The general
public celebrates the student who does well in a piano
competition and the reason given is that she is “talented.”
Reasons are the causes offered as to why an action occurred
as it did. A cause designates a relation between actions and
the events that govern them. When events determine actions,
they control them.
All actions reflect the control of properties of phenomena
around us and within us. This control takes two forms: that
from direct contact with those phenomena, and that from
an encounter with the behavior of others who pass along
the effects of their contacts. In the first case, that of no
intervening factors, a direct encounter with events governs
behavior. Actions are event-governed. The smell of coffee
is unforgettable, and its scent first thing in the morning will
have the early riser marching to the kitchen. In the second
case, that of a mediated encounter, actions are governed by
how other people’s behavior reacted to those events, and
from that reaction what they passed along lingually. Through
the medium of language, cultural actions intervene between
an event and its effect. Behavior is lingual-governed. Before
the coffee is smelled, a speaker tells the reluctant riser
“coffee is ready” and that statement results in the bed covers
slung back. These two sources of governance dictate all
activity. (For further discussion of the meaning and
distinction between the two, see Vargas, 1988). In the design
of an instructional system, both sorts of control are necessary
and important.
Lingual-governed control turns out to be the larger
portion of instruction. Most instructors simply tell someone
how to do something, even in physical education. Telling
“how” precedes the activity. “Hold the racquet this way.”
“Line your shoulders with your ears.” “Place your thumb
along the edge of your fingers.” Much of what students
learn of events about them and even events within them,
they know from what others tell them. They are told of a
place called “China.” But how many of them have seen its
monuments, smelled its pine trees, and heard the talk of its
Beijing residents? They know because they believe what
they have been told. They believe what family, friends,
neighbors, priests, politicians, and, of course, teachers tell
them. This is practical, for knowledge passed along allows
efficiency. Guests could get quite hungry waiting for the
host to figure out how the outdoor grill works. Someone
just tells him and soon the hamburgers are done. What
individuals know even of the intimate side of their own
actions depends in large part on what others say to them.
They understand the significance of their conduct only as
that significance is pointed out to them through a long
process of socialization. In socialization, other people’s
behavior mediates not only their contact with the world
around them but also that world within. People observe in
themselves what others teach them; “The Looking Glass
Self,” George Herbert Mead called it. An important part of
formal education constructs the inner listener to the inner
speaker, and how to share at least part of such speech with
others. Students learn how to talk about what they observe
in their inner world. A good portion of psychoanalysis—a
type of one-to-one instruction—deals with such inner world
observing and talking, for example, Theodor Reik’s Listening
With the Third Ear (1948), as well as does current
behaviorological analysis, such as Skinner’s Verbal Behavior
(1957/2002), especially the chapters on self-editing. An
empirical analysis of teaching such activity is Greer (2002),
especially section II. Lingual-governed instruction readies
and shapes actions in both the outer and inner worlds of
individuals.
Event-governed control gives a direct understanding of
the properties of events that are not, and often, cannot be
obtained by what others say about them. Words are
frequently too gross for the fine details and subtle shadings
of events, or words are even not yet available for new events.
(Poetry, of course, provides many examples: “Hope is the
thing with feathers.”) But words falter even in everyday
matters. The difficulties of describing the taste of scotch are
given by phrases such as “overtones of honey with a touch
of heather and the aroma of sea spray especially in its long
finish.” And descriptions of wine run largely to analogy:
“This foxy wine has bad legs.” Many discoveries are
preceded by far-fetched metaphors describing something
newly encountered but with properties only dimly
understood. In the beginnings of zoological description, new
types of animals, fancied or real, were described with human
attributes. (“… the sphinx which has brown hair and two
mammae on the breast…”. “[The hyena] imitates the human
voice among the stalls of the shepherds; and while there,
learns the name of some one of them and then calls him
away and devours him.” pp. 50, 51, from Ley (1968) quoting
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Pliny the Elder’s Historia naturalis). Words tell how other
people behave towards events, but do not provide students
with the behavior itself. Many skills are not doable until
students contact the events about which they have been
informed. They cannot know how to play the piano until
they actually contact the keyboard. (Before that, they may
know how to talk about how to play the piano.) A long
history of pottery making informs the particular style of a
culture’s vases, but the pottery maker cannot produce a fine
vase until he throws and spins the clay. That vase will then
reflect not only that culture’s history but the potter’s. The
history of every person is a singular one. Therefore any
personal encounter with events produces, if only to the
slightest degree, an outcome to an event that differs from
what has been said about it. To enhance solving and creating
behavior requires direct contact with a subject matter.
Both sorts of governance, event and lingual, play an
important role in the effectiveness of our repertoires.
Feynman (1985, p. 212) provides an example of how merely
being governed by a text may not provide sufficient
understanding of a topic.
But then I asked them how one could tell the absolute direction
of polarization, from a single piece of polaroid.
They hadn’t any idea.
I knew this took a certain amount of ingenuity, so I gave
them a hint: “Look at the light reflected from the bay outside.”
Nobody said anything.
Then I said, “Have you ever heard of Brewster’s Angle?” 
“Yes, sir! Brewster’s Angle is the angle at which light
reflected from a medium with an index of refraction is
completely polarized.”
“And which way is the light polarized when it’s reflected?”
“The light is polarized perpendicular to the plane of
reflection, sir.” Even now, I have to think about it; they knew
it cold! They even knew the tangent of the angle equals the
index!
I said, “Well?”
Still nothing. They had just told me that light reflected
from a medium with an index, such as the bay outside, was
polarized; they had even told me which way it was polarized.
I said, “Look at the bay outside, through the polaroid. Now
turn the polaroid.”
“Ooh, it’s polarized!” they said.
After a lot of investigation, I finally figured out that the
students had memorized everything, but they didn’t know what
anything meant.
In our terms: What students said was not under control of
the contingencies relevant to their direct contact with the events
of light polarization.
Of course, both kinds of control, event and lingual,
pertain to any instructional setting. The proper kind of control
from events usually starts with an instructional design that
involves lingual directions. Feynman had to provide verbal
clues to get the students’ repertoires under control of the
crucial physical phenomena. Simply bringing people into
contact with events does not guarantee they will come under
control of the critical properties of those events. A study
attempted to teach college women to “self-discover” that
still water in a bottle always remains horizontal. But simply
putting them in a situation where they could observe the
phenomena did not succeed in their achieving the correct
conclusion. As the report stated in the abstract, “Among
women college students who did not know that the surface
of still water in a bottle is always horizontal, two types of
specific task procedures designed to elicit self-discovery of
the principle were ineffective.” (Thomas, Jamison, &
Hummel, 1973, p. 173). Because events are present does
not mean they will govern actions in a certain way, or even
govern them at all. At least at first, some degree of lingual
governance may be and often is necessary. The important
conclusion cannot be emphasized enough: Neither type of
control is superior to the other, and the ratio of the kind of
controls necessary will vary for the instructional case at
issue. Directly contacting events facilitates a unique approach
to those events and facilitates understanding of how they
work independently of how they are said to work. Mediately
contacting events facilitates efficiency in how to behave
effectively and facilitates moving quickly to the next phase
of an appropriate action or to the solution of a problem.
Instructional excellence requires both types of governance
for knowing a subject, for solving problems with it, and for
creating new renditions of that subject matter.
Type of Repertoire: A day rarely passes in which
awareness of something new does not occur. Schooling
accelerates knowing new things. But in everyday life,
becoming knowledgeable occurs so automatically it is hardly
noticed. Such new knowing varies from the prosaic, almost
beneath notice, to the profound, a just learned significance
that may change one’s life and that of others. Often, what
was just learned implies action for the immediate present
or the far future; actions that may consist of solving a
problem for an effective personal and social outcome. The
radio tells of a traffic jam on the route to our job, and we
worry about getting to work on time. The newspaper reports
on a lowering of interest rates, and we wonder whether we
can lower our home mortgage. We do more, however, than
find out what is going on and simply react to its effects. We
solve problems with what we now know. We solve the
problem of getting to work on time by taking an alternative
route that avoids a traffic hold-up. We solve the problem of
getting the lowest mortgage rate by calling several banks
and comparing their rates, loan years, and loan points.
Sometimes the problem we solve leads to an unusual solution
uniquely influenced by our background. A unique solution
not explicitly anticipated but useful, if for no other reason
than it pleases, is said to be creative.
All instruction deals with three universal types of
repertoires: knowing, solving, and creating. In knowing, the
objective is to ensure that the belief systems of a culture
are well transferred, often even well indoctrinated. Whether
VARGAS324
it is knowing the times table or the metric system, a pledge
of allegiance or a pledge of abstinence, a theory of evolution
or a theory of creation, pertinent social groups demand that
repertoires repeat this material to exact specifications. Most
of education consists of passing along what powerful groups
within a society consider important for students to know.
In solving, such knowing is taken for granted. What is
required is a repertoire that is effective with known material
when encountering unanticipated circumstances. Frequently
those issues called “ethical” pose problems because
considerations are vague and consequences uncertain. Can
the concept of a person be applied to a set of cells? No
simple “yes” or “no” suffices. In science, such solving
behavior is highly prized, for the nature of scientific work
is to start from what is known in order to explore what is
not. Solving behavior starts within current boundaries of
what is known. Creating takes solving behavior a step
further. Creating behavior applies solving-skills to produce
questions not previously considered. Alternative solutions
are offered within a different framework of analysis.
Darwin’s theory of natural selection offered a different
solution to prior answers as to why forms and functions of
plants and animals changed over time. Darwin did not raise
the usual question of how a supernatural creator creates new
species. (There was already the available answer, “it just
does.”) Darwin raised the question of how new species arise
within the framework of the world we observe about us.
Einstein’s theory of relativity—actually one of invariance
of observations within different frames of reference—posed
classical physics problems within new definitions of space
and time. As the examples illustrate, the repertoire domains
of knowing, solving, and creating blend together. Each
domain, however, builds upon the other.
Differing repertoire types call for differing instructional
technologies. But since these three types of repertoires have
not been clearly discriminated, technologies pertinent to one
type of repertoire, say “knowing,” are condemned as faulty
in themselves when the fault follows from inappropriate use
for another type of repertoire, say “solving.” A technique
meant to ensure that someone can repeat the times table in
the future is not appropriate for teaching how to solve a
multiplication word problem. Criticism is misplaced when
technical and instructional context is ignored. Proper teaching
must focus on the properties of the technologies needed for
the differing attributes of repertoires. Criticism is
inappropriate when it states, for example, that a particular
technology is good only for “rote memory” when that is
exactly what should be taught in the most effective way.
Who argues against “understanding” when students do have
the skills to construct their own solutions? But trying to
teach “understanding” without underlying skills leaves
students befuddled, confused, and frustrated. Such criticisms,
as well, do not take into account the relation between
objectives and technologies. Objectives differ within each
domain type of repertoire. For example, becoming skilled
in how to solve a problem denotes a different set of
behavioral capabilities than remembering at a later date the
algorithms for already solved problems. To teach specific
skills within these different behavioral domains requires
different techniques, perhaps multiple exemplars in one case
and fluency in the other. Another example: Much of solving
and creating behavior involve superordinate actions that
change the relation of one’s own prior actions to other
actions and events. Many, or most of these, are covert.
Therefore, the implicated instructional technologies must
deal with properties of actions that cannot be observed
directly but only inferred. Each type of repertoire—knowing,
solving, and creating—calls for its own appropriately
designed technology.
Variability: The critical and vital characteristic of classes
of actions is variability. Any set of students will reveal an
extraordinary range of actions. The closer we inspect two
instances of an action, the more likely a difference will be
found. Regardless of the kind of action designated, it never
is exactly the same from time to time, from situation to
situation, from person to person. Prior to or even after
instruction in a given subject matter, no two students know
exactly the same “amount,” as designated by some standard.
And with respect to the amount they know, what is known
in that amount is never identical; certainly if the amount
tested is large. In a history course, one student may know
a date; another, a name, yet score the same in “tests.”
Furthermore, even when what is known is roughly the same,
repertoires differ with respect to what can be solved with
what is known. Two students may know the Pythagorean
Theorem, and only one applies it successfully to a given
problem. And of course, by definition, every repertoire differs
with respect to its creative expression. Asked to write a
sonnet in the Italian mode, when writing independently, no
two students will provide an identical sonnet. Whether
considering the behavior of only one student or of a set of
students, such behavior always displays diversity.
The diversity of repertoires results in two instructional
operations that occur in every classroom. Instructors attempt
to have all students behave the same and to have all students
behave differently. Overlooking the necessity of the two
apparently contradictory efforts produces a lot of needless
argument. Though not acknowledged, instruction always
endeavors to produce both convergence and divergence. In
convergence, instruction narrows the diversity of a given
class of repertoires until all repertoires are standardized with
respect to a criterion. Everyone must give the same answer
as to what is up or down, right or left, two plus two, one
minus one, a fugue or a sonata, a rondo or a scherzo, a
planet or a star, the capital of Spain or of France, and on.
All societies, all schools, all educators engage in this sort
of instruction. They want students to know the prior activities
effective for that culture and to know the belief systems
deemed important by the elites of that culture. Concurrently,
in divergence, the range of repertoires is expanded until
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repertoires differ as much as possible. Educators promote
this effect with many clichés and phrases; for example, it
is said to be of great import to think “outside of the box.”
A problem in mathematics may be given in which the aim
is not to provide a solution, but to provide a procedure that
differs from the usual one of obtaining a solution. Efforts
to teach so-called “self-expression” and “self-fulfillment,”
through activities such as the writing of haiku, make explicit
the divergence aim.
But a gap exists between the reality and the rhetoric.
Michelle Feynman (2005, p. xx) mentions this gap in an
incident with her father, Richard P. Feynman, the Nobel
physicist, “When I was in high school, he started showing
me shortcuts in my math homework that diverged from the
teacher’s methods. I was subsequently scolded by my Algebra
II teacher for not solving the problem in the right way.”
Divergence has a great press, but apparently few takers. How
many of these incidents occur in subtle and constant ways
in classrooms, and other social settings, is hard to say. 
The ratio of convergence and divergence effort in the
classroom is as much a political matter as it is a technical
one. Societies differ considerably on the degree of variability
they will tolerate and teach. They may “drift” into allowing
only a narrow range of actions and beliefs. The Ming
Dynasty ushered in a period of extreme conservatism.
Among many examples, Kennedy (1987, p. 8) points out
that “Printing was restricted to scholarly works and not
employed for the widespread dissemination of practical
knowledge, much less for social criticism.” Many of the
gains of China’s past were allowed to erode. Kennedy also
notes that over time, the Ottoman Empire grew more
conservative and restrictive. “[It] increasingly suffered from
some of the defects of being … severely orthodox in its
attitude toward initiative, dissent … [T]he bureaucracy
hardened, preferring conservatism to change, and stifling
innovation” (p. 12). Such aims are reflected in school
curricula. Regardless, however, of the attempt to have one
overarching religious or political (or both in sync) belief
system, most societies, as their technologies and economies
become more complex, begin to demand a wider range of
skills and a deeper level of specialization. (An elite, however,
can become sufficiently comfortable with its life style, or
religious ideology, that no further progress in productivity
seems necessary. Instead, specialization increases in
entertainment and art forms, including the art form of “living
well” or “living properly.”) 
In education, these skill and specialization demands first
manifest themselves at the organizational level in the design
of convergent and divergent requirements in the curriculum.
Student repertoires, brought together in the “basics,” then
are shifted into different disciplinary “concentrations.” From
school boards to faculty committees, educators spend a great
deal of time on these “innovations.” Often, the concern is
that there is not sufficient “divergence”; that students are not
sufficiently acquainted with the two cultures of the sciences
and the humanities. Even more, critics contend that within
each of the “cultures,” there is too much specialization.
Instead of the usual two-dimensional array of courses,
physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth, each with its usual
“string of pearls” topics separate from those of other courses,
Holtan (2005, pp. 201-208) argues for a “mosaic” of topics,
each interrelated with those of other courses. These efforts
are not trivial. But they should not be confused with the
engineering technology of instruction. Though their claimants
often assert them as improvements in instruction, these
changes are not innovations in instructional process.
At the instructional level, each instructional setting
attempts both convergence and divergence. Students must
learn terms and forms of Spanish understood by Spanish
speakers before they can write an essay in Spanish. The
equations of algebra and calculus are the same world wide
and these must be learned before a complex problem in
intercepting a comet or achieving a Mars landing can be
solved. To be creative one must know something with which
to be creative. One cannot compose music without knowing
its sounds. (Beethoven’s deafness happened after such
knowledge.) No one can write a poem without knowing a
language, and more than that, without knowing its rhythms
and terms. These are established educational clichés for
establishing conformity and then teaching diversity. It is the
nonestablished ones, as in the Michelle Feynman example,
that educators find hard to understand and tolerate.
Convergent and divergent operations are always in uneasy
tension. To gain the benefits of both requires accepting their
dual presence.
Not making the distinction between convergence
objectives and divergence objectives and not accepting the
necessity of both has led, and continues to lead, to futile
and emotional arguments. These spill over into the prior
considerations of proper instructional technology. As pointed
out, the disagreements over so-called “memorization” and
so-called “understanding” miss the point. These
disagreements exalt only one type of repertoire, as if the
other were not equally important. The general issue is how,
within the same instructional setting, repertoires are
converged with respect to what must be known and diverged
with how the knower treats what has been learned.
Final Remarks
Engineering from behaviorological science produces
contingency-based instructional systems. The two
components of all contingency-based instructional systems
are the student repertoire and the instructional setup. The
repertoire and setup components include all possible elements
of an instructional system. Take one feature, that of
governance: All instruction arranges for students to encounter
the world directly as well as through what others say about
it. Or take another feature, variability: All instruction teaches
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students to become more alike and more different in what
they say or do. And so on. The repertoire component
includes all possible permutations of the elements relevant
in transforming student actions. The setup component covers
all possible instructional circumstances that students may
encounter.
Note that elements within the Triad Model’s instructional
system’s components of “repertoire” and “setup” are category
names for classes of variables, not the variables themselves.
Within each category, the actual events and their properties,
when observed, handled, and controlled, are then designated
as variables. For example, within the repertoire component,
the category of “governance.” It is further classified into
event-governed and lingual-governed. Lingual-governed
consists of lingual units and their functional relations to the
events responsible for them. When functional relations are
designated for specific lingual units, this appoints those
relations with independent and dependent variables with
ascribed values. Following Skinner’s analysis (in Verbal
Behavior, 1957/2002) of lingual units, a given functional
relation can be described by the independent variables at
issue; whether, for example, a verbal relation is of the sort
called a “tact.” The properties of these relations are thus
available for investigating their validity or engineering them
instructionally. (Greer, his colleagues, and his students such
as Greer & Keohane, 2005, provide a good example of this
effort. It is more than a good example, however, as it
exemplifies “development” within the behaviorological
domain. Their systematic and empirical effort reveals cultural
evolution at work; how complex behavioral and lingual
forms develop through the successive shaping of
contingency-driven action forms at the individual level.)
The setup and repertoire components described can be
found in any instructional setting, if only in incipient form.
Unfortunately, in various degrees, instructors neglect them.
Most are overlooked. Their properties are not well delineated.
Technologies inappropriately address them. Their complexity
is barely appreciated. Their difficulties treated in
inappropriate and superficial manner. From the start of
formalized instruction, solutions to the problem of effective
instructing and learning have been along the lines of a better
chalkboard, stronger family values, and a rigorous application
of the paddle. But overlooking the separate and subtle
elements of setup and repertoire components presents only
a first difficulty as to why instructional engineering proceeds
so slowly. Perhaps a greater difficulty in the design,
execution, and assessment of instructional systems are the
interactions of setup and repertoire components. This latter
consideration will be taken up in a later article.
Conclusion
Currently, few teach by systematically manipulating the
values of the variables of the repertoire or the setup
component while holding constant other variables of these
components. Much of this oversight has to do with attempts
to seek an explanation for instructional effects in a
dimension of inner being that is either neurological or
psychological. By depending on these neurological and
psychological realms and by basing instructional
technologies on the attributes postulated by those realms,
educators overlook the complexity of the behavioral
dimension. They abandon the potential feast of
behaviorological science for the few crumbs they can gather
from other disciplines.
With behaviorological science, instructors can engineer
the interaction of repertoire and setup components. Such
designed interaction and its outcomes continually create
new instructional techniques based on instructional
contingencies derived from the parent science. A number
of these have already appeared and they continually emerge.
No particular technique defines contingency-based
instruction. Contingency-based systems of instruction go
beyond any given specific technique such as programmed
instruction or precision teaching. But to note the
circumscribed nature of these techniques does not imply
abandoning them. These good techniques belong to the set
of technologies that ensue from a contingency analysis of
the instructional setting. Other techniques will by and by
arise as the analysis rightfully inheres to the intersect of
contingency and action. Such an analysis forces an
appreciation of the complexity of the instructional task and
of the resources necessary to carry it out. It is a task that
must take into account not only the classes of actions of
one individual, but of many.
The industrial revolution made mass education
imperative. A society based on machinery instead of muscle
required workers with sufficiently good repertoires to follow
complex directions and read simple instructions. The service
economy and the participatory polity now makes the
demand for literacy greater. But one problem has always
bedeviled mass education—the problem of variability. Not
the problem of variety in body; that is easily handled. No.
The critical problem in educating large numbers of people
has always been and always will be the diversity in the
range and depth of repertoires. It is a problem made
especially acute by trying to reach a common standard while
concurrently attempting to achieve the excellence of which
each individual is capable. It is not solved by slogans such
as “Leave No Child Behind.” Nor is the problem solved
by electronically expediting what is done badly. Educators
can solve the problem, but not by placing a computer and
a video in every classroom. Computers and communication
media provide the roadbed to transport instruction. But
tailoring that instruction to the individual repertoire requires
other means, behavioral means. Such customized instruction
travels only by means of contingency-based instructional
systems operating within reorganized educational
institutions.
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